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Abstract 
The analysis of the category of minority directors is discussed in this paper in an 
ambitious undertaking which hopefully is not overly so. This niche body of directors, 
a classification present in very few jurisdictions across the world, is discussed against 
the backdrop of a legal framework, Italy, where it has been codified for quite some 
time. Italy then, will be the starting point of a legislative expedition which will firstly 
encounter the shores of a comparator, Britain, and its local system of corporate 
governance, before ultimately reaching its journey’s end in Brussels, and its legal 
framework of corporate governance addressed to listed companies. Based on 
the findings of this doctrinal analysis, it is suggested that the notion of minority 
directors as public safe-keepers, albeit exclusively confined to listed companies, could 
spearhead the agenda of the EU legislature and is a device fit for transplantation across 
the different corporate law frameworks, first and foremost the British one. Ultimately, 
through a speculative reference to the notion of ‘board diversity’ and the literature 
sprouted on this concept, the Italian voting list model is discussed as a means of adding 
both value to listed entities and efficiency to the relevant boards.  
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1. Introduction 
Epistemologically, minority directors are members of the governing body of a 
company, having been directly appointed to this position by the minority shareholders, 
i.e. by the shareholders who did not succeed in achieving either the absolute majority, 
or the relative one, of the votes. As the minority director does not ‘represent’ the 
majority but strictly speaking the minority, as elucidated further in this paper, its role 
should theoretically ensure that the resolutions of the company are adopted with the 
involvement of a plurality of voices, including those somehow connected with the 
minority, or one - the largest, amongst the minority groups. As highlighted by the 
principal literature, 1 the purpose of this genus of director allows an organised minority 
that selects only a fraction of the board to ‘still benefit from access to information and 
in some cases, the opportunity to form coalitions with independent directors.’  
Empirically, there is a European jurisdiction, Italy, where this category has been 
formally adopted within its domestic legislative framework.2 As clarified in this paper, 
the legal concept under discussion was introduced, in 2005, by virtue of an ad hoc 
piece of legislation addressed exclusively to listed companies. Essentially, the legal 
provisions substantiate in an obligation levied on these entities to ensure that at least 
one director shall be appointed by the ‘minority body’ of the legal entity. 
Interestingly, in the jurisdiction under consideration, the innovative category of the 
minority director does not engender, nor is regarded as inconsistent with, the 
independent director. The latter remains a resolute feature in the architecture of the 
corporate governance of listed companies, as professionals who, albeit appointed by 
the majority, do not hold personal or professional connections with the dominant 
members.3   
The rules governing the notion of the minority directors are discussed and analysed in 
this paper from a comparative and cross-border perspective. In this respect, the 
contribution seeks to discuss and analyse the main features of this category of minority 
directors in a jurisdiction (the Italian) where legal provisions have been shaped for a 
while. In doing so, an attempt is made to compare these legal provisions with the 
correspondent legal body existing in other jurisdictions where this category is missing. 
In this respect, emphasis will be placed on the codes of corporate governance existing 
                                                          
1 L Enriques, H Hansmann and R Kraakman, ‘The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-
Shareholder Constituency’ in R Kraakman, J Armour, P Davis, L Enriques, HB Hansmann, G Hertig, KJ Hopt,  H 
Kanda, EB Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd edn Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2009) 90.  
2 From a study published by the OECD (OECD – Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs – Corporate 
Governance Committee, Peer Review 4: Board Nomination and Election (April 2012) 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/CA/CG(2012)1/FINAL&docLan
guage=En accessed 13 October 2015) it can be inferred that, in addition to Italy, the comparator in this paper, only 
Israel adopts a category of directors appointed according to lists, thus constituting minority directors. However, in 
the Italian literature (S Alvaro, G Mollo and G Siciliano, Il Voto di Lista per la Rappresentanza di Azionisti di 
Minoranza nell’Organo di Amministrazione delle Societa’, Consob, Quaderni Giuridici, November 2012, 24) it is 
suggested that Spain too, which is not part of the OECD survey, is a further jurisdiction where the minority 
directors have been recognised in statute as an autonomous category since as early as 1951, to be later amalgamated 
in the law of corporate entities of 1989.   
3 For a recent doctrinal discussion about independent directors, see M Gutiérrez and M Sáez, ‘Deconstructing 
Independent Directors’ (2013)13 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 63-94.  
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in this country, both the Codice di Autodisciplina applicable to the Italian listed 
companies,4 and its counterpart across the Channel, the British Corporate Governance 
Code.5 The British and the US system of corporate governance shall be adopted as 
comparators whereas the EU legal framework will be the ultimate landscape of 
discussion. 
Within the broader discussion about the notion of corporate governance,6 the ultimate 
purpose of the analysis is to ascertain whether, first and foremost, the category of 
minority director may have a future in the corporate governance across different 
countries, and more generally, in Europe. Secondly, the paper tries to assess, in a more 
speculative way, whether this category may replace, or – more likely - amalgamate 
with further and better known categories of directors, namely the non-executive and 
the independent ones. The latter, universally adopted in listed companies in major 
jurisdictions, have proved controversial in the last decade, particularly because of their 
ineffectiveness during the latest financial crises. The introduction of minority directors, 
alongside the ‘modernisation’ of the controversial independent directors, 7  could 
provide a legal scenario on which to lay down the foundations of a new and more 
mature system of corporate governance.   
  
2. Minority Directors in a Nutshell   
It may appear a paradox to initiate a contribution on the minority directors by 
affirming that there is no such thing as a minority director! In fact, in one of the very 
few jurisdictions - the Italian one - where this category can be somehow identified, no 
express definition is provided. In detail, in some specific corporations of that 
jurisdiction, namely companies listed on a stock market, minority shareholders are 
entitled to take part in the management of the company. ‘Minority director’ is not an 
official nomenclature, simply because it is not articulated in the legislation. Rather, it 
is a term coined in the literature,8 in order to express a category that, indirectly, is 
                                                          
4  Comitato per la Corporate Governance, ‘Codice di Autodisciplina’, July 2015 
<http://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsaitaliana/regolamenti/corporategovernance/codice2015.pdf> accessed 13 
October 2015. 
5  Financial Reporting Council, ‘The UK Corporate Governance Code’, September 2014 
<https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-
2014.pdf> accessed 13 October 2015. 
6 In the vast literature about corporate governance, see B Tricker, Corporate Governance. Principles, Policies, and 
Practices (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012); R Kraakman, J Armour, P Davies, L Enriques, H 
Hansmann, G Hertig, K Hopt, H Kanda, E Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional 
Approach (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009). 
7 A recent suggestion among scholars is that independent directors should be converted from private gatekeepers 
to ‘public third-party enforcers’. See M Gutiérrez & M Sáez, ‘Deconstructing Independent Directors (2013)13 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 92. In a brief formula, they should be ‘agents of the regulator rather than agents 
of the shareholders.’ (ibid)  
8 See, for instance, F Denozza, ‘L’ “Amministratore di Minoranza” e i suoi Critici’ in Assogestioni, La Corporate 
Governance e il Risparmio Gestito, 2006, 21-25. However, in the same Italian literature (M Cera, ‘Il Buon Governo 
delle Banche tra Autonomia Privata e Vigilanze Pubbliche’ [2015] Rivista delle Società 947), an explicit concern 
about the rationale behind the ‘minority directors’ is expressed. It is opined that minority directors would affect 
the sacrosanct principle which permeates a company: the management of an entity requires the existence of a 
‘cohesive body, flanked by its massive tools of internal auditing (...).’ (ibid) The internal auditing system, 
ultimately, would not make sense if ‘the audit, the guardianship, was conferred on minority directors’ ( ibid)    
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inferable from that fact that in listed companies, the election of candidates occurs 
through lists of contenders. The way to achieve this is to make mandatory in the 
bylaws9 of the listed legal entity that grouped minority shareholders may appoint at 
least one director. More practically, before the shareholders’ meeting of each company 
where the appointment is expected to be made, a qualified percentage of shareholders 
are entitled to submit a list of prospective directors. The percentage shall be qualified 
in its upper threshold, either by law and/or by the market authority, to ensure that the 
minority shareholder is really a minority one, rather than a disguised majority 
shareholder.   
Company law’s ‘general majority principle’ has it that the majority shareholders 
appoint, through their vote, all the directors of the company, including the independent 
ones; the minority is a mere spectator, who shall passively accept the decisions of the 
majority. 10  Nevertheless, the consequences of this axiom can be partly reversed 
through the legal device under discussion: a quota of directors, expressed either in 
terms of percentage or in terms of numbers, shall be reserved to the minority list. The 
latter is the list of shareholders which, without having any connection with the 
majority ones, have managed to achieve the highest consensus in the Assembly 
General Meeting (AGM). The first candidate of the most successful minority list will 
be appointed director, as will the second candidate of the same list, if the quota of 
Board of Directors allows the appointment of an additional director.  
Technically speaking, the director appointed as such is not explicitly regarded and 
defined as minority director, although it is quite obvious that, because chosen from 
the list of the successful minority directors, he will certainly represent (also) the 
‘soundings’ and ‘voices’ of the minorities. The rationale behind this category is to 
ensure that minorities are practically involved in the management of the companies, 
particularly the listed companies, where the investors and their protection represent 
paramount interests. 
 
3. The Legislative Rules of Appointment of the Board of directors: UK & Italy 
In Italy, art. 2383(1) of the Italian Civil Code (ICC) confers on the shareholders’ 
meeting the competence to appoint the power to appoint directors11  according to an 
absolute majority principle.12 This principle is not mandatory, for the reason that ‘for 
purposes of appointment of the representatives, the bylaws [may] fix specific rules’ 
(art. 2368(1), last part).13 The entrenched interpretation of the rules under discussion 
                                                          
9 In this paper, the term ‘bylaws’ shall be used as synonym of ‘articles of association’.  
10 This notion of dominance of the majority and the binding nature of these decisions on the minority has been an 
entrenched concept in the Italian legal system. See, among the others, F Ferrara Jr and F Corsi, Gli Imprenditori e 
le Società (13th edn Giuffre’ Editore, Milan 2006) 573-622. 
11 ‘Directors are appointed by the shareholders’ meeting, except for the first directors, who are appointed in the 
memorandum of association (…) .’ (our translation). 
12 Art 2368(1), ICC: ‘L’assemblea ordinaria è regolarmente costituita quando è rappresentata almeno la metà del 
capitale sociale, escluse dal computo le azioni prive del diritto di voto nell’assemblea medesima.’  
13 ‘The by-laws may establish specific rules for the appointment of officers of the company.’ (our translation)  
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is that specific clauses in the bylaws in force, of which in the AGM the vote shall be 
cast according to lists of directors submitted in advance, are permissible.  
With regards to Britain, it is surprising how relatively simple and laconic the rules 
concerning the appointment of directors are. The approach to the way directors are 
appointed is comparatively loose. The company’s articles arrange the relevant rules, 
given the fact that, as pointed out by scholars,14 the main concern of the Companies 
Act 2006 (CA 2006) is ‘to give publicity to those who are appointed rather than to 
regulate the appointment process’.15  
In more detail, apart from the first directors (usually appointed by the subscribers of 
the memorandum), the appointment of the subsequent directors is bestowed on the 
shareholders,16 through an ordinary resolution.17 It is worth pointing out that this is 
what usually happens in corporations; nevertheless, there is no such thing as a 
requirement by the CA 2006 that the directors are elected ‘by the shareholders in a 
general meeting’.18 Although the observation of the practice suggests that this is 
usually the case, this is ‘the consequence of the provisions of the company’s articles, 
not of the Act’s requirements’.19 The provisions in the articles of association could be 
very eclectic and disparate; the appointment of the company directors could be 
bestowed upon debenture holders and even third parties.20   
 
4. The Genesis of Minority Directors in the Italian Corporate Governance 
As already mentioned, a jurisdiction where a form of minority directors is de facto 
recognised, is the Italian one. The way this has been achieved is by the legislation and, 
more specifically, a derogation from the way directors are usually appointed 
(fundamentally, the majority ‘strikes the pot’ and gets 100 per cent of the board). In 
this respect, the Italian corporate legislation has been characterised in the last two 
decades by two main developments: the Privatisation Act (1994);21 and the Savings 
Act (2005).22  
As to the former, law 30 July 1994, no 474 has made it mandatory for companies 
previously owed by the Government, to introduce in their bylaws a clause on the 
election of directors according to lists submitted by diverse groups of shareholders. 
                                                          
14 PL Davies & S Worthington, Gower & Davies. Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2012) 398. 
15 See Companies Act 2006, Draft Model Articles for Public Companies, ss 33-41.   
16 Worcester Corsetry Ltd v Witting [1936] Ch 640 (CoA). See D French, S Mayson & C Ryan, Mayson, French 
& Ryan on Company Law (32th edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) 439.  
17 Link Agricultural Pty Ltd v Shanahan (1998) 28 ACSR 498. 
18 PL Davies & S Worthington, Gower & Davies. Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2012) 398. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Law no 474 of 31 May 1994, converting, with amendments, law decree 31 May 1994, no 332, containing norms 
aimed to accelerate the procedures of divestment of holdings by both the Government and Public Authorities in 
joint stock companies. 
22 Law no 262 of 28 December 2005 (‘Legal provisions for the protection of the savings and the governance of the 
financial markets’). 
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This clause was – and is still – unmodifiable, so long as the bylaws are fitted with a 
threashold to the holding in its share-capital.  
In more detail, according to these ad hoc legal provisions, the AGM shall be convened 
by a notice to be published at least 30 days before the meeting. The agenda shall 
contain the items of business. In view of the AGM, those entitled to submit a list of 
candidates are the departing directors or the shareholders that represent at least one 
per cent of the share with voting rights in the ordinary shareholders’ meeting. Such 
lists shall be made public at the company office (at least 20 days before the AGM) 
and with dissemination in at least three national newspapers at least ten days before 
the planned shareholders’ meeting. Corollary of this microcosm of rules is the legal 
provision (art. 2(1)(let d)) which stipulates that the successful minority list shall be 
given ‘as a whole at least one fifth of the directors ...’.  
As far as the second piece of legislation is concerned (Law 28 December 2005, no 
262), a specific legal provision (art. 1) has made mandatory, for purposes of the 
appointment of directors, a bylaws’ provision requiring grouped shareholders to 
submit a list of candidates. This norm applies to all kinds of listed companies.23 The 
legislative technique whereby this has occurred, is the amendment to the Italian 
Consolidated Finance Act, particularly the introduction of a new art. 147-ter. The 
Consolidated Finance Act (the TUF) refers to Legislative Decree 24 February 1998, 
no 58, amended by Law Decree 24 January 2015 no 3, converted with amendments 
by Law 24 March 2015, no 33. 
So long as the bylaws of a listed company stipulates as such, the Board of Directors 
shall be ‘elected on the basis of lists of candidates’.24 The details of these provisions 
can be summarised, also in relation to the rules contained in the Privatisation Act, 
already examined in this Section 4. In greater detail, the lists shall be lodged with the 
company office at least 25 days before the date of the shareholders’ meeting in charge 
of appointing the directors. Similarly, at least 25 days before the meeting, they shall 
be publicised, through the internet and the other forms fixed by the Market Authority, 
in its delegated legislation. The dissemination to the public shall occur at least 21 days 
before the date that has been fixed for the shareholders’ meeting. 
Beyond the black-letter of the legislation, it is possible to summarise that, in Italy, the 
minority director is a concept indirectly inferable from the ‘list of candidates’. The list 
of candidates, originally introduced for a niche category of legal entities (privatised 
companies previously owned by the Italian Government or public authorities), has 
been extended more recently (courtesy of the Savings Act 2005) to all listed 
companies, and ultimately the relevant legal provision is codified within art. 147-ter 
of the TUF. According to this norm, the most voted list of candidates, which is by 
                                                          
23 The legislative technique whereby this has occurred, is the amendment to the Italian Consolidated Finance Act, 
particularly the introduction of a new art 147-ter. The Consolidated Finance Act (henceforth the TUF) refers to 
Legislative Decree 24 February 1998, no 58, amended by Law Decree 24 January 2015 no 3, converted with 
amendments by Law 24 March 2015, no 33. 
24 G Presti and M Rescigno, Corso di Diritto Commerciale, Volume II (7th edn Zanichelli Editore, Bologna 2015) 
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definition the majority one25, will not get the entirety of the board, as it would happen 
in other jurisdictions. Conversely, the second voted list26 will be entitled to receive a 
quota of directors, no less than one27. More specifically, the number of minority 
directors shall be one or, if the board of directors is made up of no fewer than seven 
people, no fewer than two.28   
 
5. Minority Directors: the Details of the Italian Legislation 
As made explicit in Section 1 above, one of the purposes of this contribution is to 
assess whether minority directors can be a new, efficient tool to solve the intrinsic 
problems of corporate governance (eg lack of participation of the minorities in the 
decision making process) or, to be less pessimistic, a way to improve the corporate 
governance in listed companies.  
In this respect, it is necessary to clarify that the minority directors are not, legally 
speaking, independent directors30. Minority directors may hold specific interests of 
the minority shareholder and these interests may be inconsistent with those of the 
company or of the shareholders in general. As far as ‘independent directors’ are 
concerned, they are supposed to be independent from connections with the majority 
shareholder, not from the minority shareholders which indicated him.  
To clarify the ‘serpentine’ development of the Italian legislation, the following 
principles should be highlighted. The appointment of minority directors was originally 
required merely by soft legislation, for listed companies. However, in the further 
legislative developments, the category resulted in being somehow codified and 
                                                          
25 It can however happen that the most voted list submitted a number of candidates inferior to seats available in 
the board of directors. This can lead to the bizarre situation of a minority list that has a majority of directors on the 
board. 
26 The straightforward definition of ‘minority list’ is the list that has not achieved the majority of votes in the AGM. 
However, the concept of minority list warrants a more in-depth discussion. In actual terms, there are two potential 
circumstances which reflect possible attitudes of the investor towards the governance of the listed company.  
On the one hand, the shareholder, whether the majority or the minority one, might be inclined to indicate in its list 
fewer candidates than available seats in the BoD. If this does happen, then that list, albeit with the highest 
percentage of votes, does not get the majority of directors. On the other hand, the shareholder, including the 
minority one, may aim at snatching the majority of the seats in the BoD. In this case, it will ind icate in the voting 
list as many candidates as the number of available seats to be filled in within the BoD. In the latter scenario, the 
expectation of this shareholder will be met so long as this list resulted in getting the majority of votes in the AGM.  
As a consequence, the notion of ‘protection of minorities’ in companies adopting a voting list, where minority 
directors can be appointed, is broader and more articulated than the one existing in other entities.   
27 Italian listed companies adopt, primarily, a majority system, which provides for the attribution of the majority 
of seats to the list with the highest number of votes. A number of seats, specified in the bylaws, is given to 
candidates taken from at least one or, depending on the actual provisions of the bylaws, more minority lists.  
Sometimes, mainly in the financial sector, companies have adopted a ‘proportional’ voting mechanism. In this 
case, there is no attribution of a majority bonus. The seats are usually distributed through the ‘quotient’ method, 
which involves the allocation of votes to the candidates by dividing the number of votes obtained by each list for 
the sequence number of the individual candidate on the list. Once this count is complete, it could be necessary to 
carry out some adjustments in order to ensure that the final count is consistent with any legal requirement (eg the 
gender representation and quota) and pertinent bylaws. 
28 Art 147-ter of the TUF. Among scholars, see G Presti and M Rescigno, Corso di Diritto Commerciale, Volume 
II (7th edn Zanichelli Editore, Bologna 2015) 145. 
30 In companies that have adopted the one-tier system however, the minority director must possess the same 
requirements of independence as those in place for the members of the statutory board of auditors (art 147 -ter, 
paragraph 3, TUF).  
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encompassed within the statute.31 Furthermore, the appointment of minority directors 
was originally grounded on the bylaws of the company, based on the ICC. However, 
in the latest version of the TUF, particularly article. 147-ter, it is obvious that the 
bylaws of every listed company shall be required, on a mandatory basis, to stipulate 
that the appointment of directors is organised through lists, to make sure that the 
winning minority list is given no less than a seat in the board32.  
More specifically, the piece of legislation to refer is the TUF. Article 147-ter stipulates: 
‘The Statute provides for members of the Board of Directors to be elected on the basis 
of the lists of candidates and defines the minimum participation share required for 
their presentation, at an extent not above a fortieth of the share capital or at a different 
extent established by CONSOB 33 , with the regulation taking into account 
capitalization, floating funds and ownership structures of listed companies.’34 
At this point, some clarifications are necessary. First and foremost, the legal provision 
at stake does not give a mere option to the listed company to use lists of candidates; 
as said, its use is mandatory.35 Furthermore, because such a norm is addressed only to 
public companies, the lists of candidates are mandatory for these companies, although 
they are optional for legal entities outside this perimeter. Given the flexibility provided 
by the ICC (see the analysis of the relevant legal provisions contained in the previous 
Section 4), a mere alteration of the bylaws of any Italian joint stock company would 
allow it to adopt the list of candidates system. As a result, institutions carrying out a 
reserved activity such as credit institutions and management funds, if not listed, are 
not subject to the legislation at stake, although the appointment according to lists may 
be an option that the bylaws may well contemplate.  
From a different perspective, an explanation has been provided from the outset about 
the fact that there is no such thing as a definition of minority directors.  
In the AGM of Italian listed companies, the election of directors will be based on the 
principle that lists may be submitted. The list that receives the majority of the votes, 
appoints the directors. However, at least one member shall be granted to the ‘second-
best’ list36. More precisely, as stipulated under the art 147-ter(3) of the TUF: 
                                                          
31 Also in this case, the TUF, at art 147-ter(4). ‘… at least one of the members of the board of directors, or at least 
two if the board of directors is made up of more than seven members, shall possess the requisites of independence 
established [ for the members of the board of auditors] …’. Further, if this is required by the bylaws, the directors 
shall possess the further requisites of independence established by the Codes that either the company in charge of 
the securities market or the business associations (eg the Banking Association) had to establish from time to time.    
32 Nothing prevents the statute of a company providing for the assignment to more than one list for a place in the 
Board of Directors. 
33 The Italian Market Authority. CONSOB is acronym of Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa.   
34 The aforementioned provision is applicable to companies that have opted for the one-tier system or what is 
defined in Italy as the ‘traditional’ one. Conversely, in those entities that have adopted the two-tier one, the election 
of the supervisory board is governed by the provisions for the election of the board of auditors. 
35 Nevertheless, the language used within the TUF could have been more explicit. It is affirmed ‘prevede’ - 
therefore ‘it envisages’ -, whereas the auxiliary ‘deve’ - therefore, ‘it shall envisage’ or ‘it must envisage’ - would 
have made the provision more clearly mandatory.  It is worth highlighting that this statutory provision requires the 
members of the board to be elected on the basis of lists of candidates, not the presentation of lists itself. 
36 As the number of minority directors is limited, the potential conflict within the board should not hinder any 
board's activity. 
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‘…at least one member shall be elected from the minority list that obtained the largest 
number of votes …’.37 
To elaborate, the expression ‘at least one member’ means that the bylaws of the listed 
company may also increase the quota reserved to minority shareholders, in so far as 
to allow them to have two or even more directors originating from the winning 
minority list or from more than one minority list. In this case, the post shall be given 
to the first two (or more) candidates appearing in the list. Similarly, according to the 
same line of reasoning, it would be consistent with these legal provisions a rule in the 
bylaws whereby at least one director is reserved to the most voted minority list and a 
further director is reserved to the second minority list. Also in this case, the candidate 
to whom the post as director is assigned, shall be the first one indicated in the minority 
list of candidates that was the second most voted38.  
Furthermore, to make sure that the minority list is not a sham and it legitimately 
represents the interests of a minority rather than indirectly those of the minority, it is 
added in the same article 147-ter(3) of the TUF that such a list shall not be ‘linked in 
any way, even indirectly, with the shareholders who presented or voted the list which 
was declared first by the number of votes.’  
More importantly, the minority list is not competing with the majority one: this list, 
in order to be qualified as ‘minority list’, needs to be presented by shareholders 
representing no more than a fortieth of the share-capital of the listed company.39 This 
norm is justified by the circumstance that a higher percentage would contradict the 
same ontology and essence of the minority shareholder and, therefore, the minority 
director. It is worth noting that the threshold of the fortieth of the capital, required by 
the Italian legislation for purposes of definition of a minority list, can be increased or 
decreased by the market authority (the CONSOB) of that country (Italy), in force of 
its own regulation, ‘taking into account capitalization, floating funds and ownership 
structures of listed companies’.40 
Additionally, the legislation delegated to the CONSOB ‘takes pain’ to define the 
concept of connection, upon the occurrence of which the minority list shall not be 
                                                          
37 In other words, the largest minority will have one, or more than one director, irrespective of the proportion of 
their shareholding in the share-capital of the listed company concerned. This circumstance has been harshly 
criticised by some of Italian scholars: see F Bonelli, ‘Ecco Perché non può Funzionare l’Amministratore di 
Minoranza’ Milano Finanza, 13 April 2005, 13. The means of appointment of the minority director makes it clear 
that only ‘one’, amongst possibly more, minority shareholders, will have the right to elect its candidate. It is argued 
that this circumstance infringes the principle of equal treatment between shareholders, and it is used by some 
scholars to deny the utility of enhancing the protection of minorities through the introduction of a voting list:  see 
https://circabc.europa.eu/faces/extension/wai/navigation/container.jsp. See also European Company Law Experts 
Paul Davies, Guido Ferrarini, Klaus Hopt, Alain Pietrancosta, Rolf Skog, Stanislaw Soltysinski, Jaap Winter, Eddy 
Wymeersch, ‘Making Corporate Governance Codes More Effective A Response to the European Commission’s 
Action Pans of December 2012’ December 2013 <22 July 2011, in 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1912548> accessed 1st October 2015. 
38 As far as the removal of the minority director is concerned, there is a dearth of specific legal provisions.  
Nevertheless, a minority director shall be potentially removed in accordance with general rules therefore, even 
without a ‘just cause’. Bearing this in mind, in listed companies, a resolution of this kind would be a risky move 
as it would seriously affect the company’s reputation. 
39 Art. 147-ter(1), first paragraph, first part, of the TUF. 
40 Art. 147-ter(1) of the TUF. 
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eligible for purposes of appointment of its representative in the BoD. In this respect, 
a parameter to ascertain such connection shall be, by way of rebuttable presumption, 
the list of connection contemplated in the current CONSOB Issuers’ Regulation, art. 
101-bis.41    
Furthermore, a list presented by a minority which in reality is connected with the 
majority, would potentially give rise to a legal claim, for instance by other minority 
shareholders having presented the losing list. These may provide evidence of the fact 
that the asserted ‘lack of links’ was not genuine. This would lead to an invalidation of 
the resolution of appointment of the minority director(s) and, additionally, damages 
awarded to the minorityshareholders divested of their right to appoint their 
representatives, according to mandatory rules. This possible scenario further 
highlights the responsibilities of the BoD chairman in connection with the procedures 
aimed to appoint the board, including the victorious minority list. 
As regards these numerous norms and legal provisions, it is correctly emphasised, 
doctrinally,42 that this micro-system of rules confers on the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors an important and significant role: the identification of what can be regarded, 
from a legal point of view, as the minority list of candidates, through the assessment 
of the requisite of independence that each elected candidate, including the minority 
candidate, must possess.  
Finally, the bylaws of the Italian listed companies may limit the right of minority lists 
to appoint their own representative. More specifically, according to the second part of 
article 147-ter(1), TUF.  
‘… The Statute may also provide that, with regard to the apportion of the 
directors to be elected, what is not to be taken into account are the lists which 
have not reached a percentage of votes at least equal to half of the one required 
by the Statute for the presentation of same.’43 
 
6. Minority Directors and Independent Directors in Italy: a difficult 
cohabitation? A comparison with UK 
As said before, minority directors represent a peculiarity of the Italian system of 
corporate governance, 45  whereas independent directors are a cross-border, 
                                                          
41 This view is confirmed doctrinally too. See G Presti and M Rescigno, Corso di Diritto Commerciale. Volume II 
(7th edn Zanichelli Editore, Bologna 2015) 144-145. 
On the risk that the minority list be linked, not explicitly, with the majority list, see CONSOB Communication n. 
DEM/9017893 of 26 February 2009. The latter recommends that shareholders submitting a "minority list" make a 
declaration stating the non-existence of links, even indirect, with shareholders holding, either individually or 
jointly, a controlling or majority stake in the company concerned. 
42 See F Benedetto, ‘Commentary on Articles 147-ter-, 147-quarter, 147-quinquies’, in F Vella (ed), Commentario 
T.U.F. Vol II (Giappichelli Editore, Bologna 2012) 1577.   
43 Emphasis added.  
45 According to Assonime, La Corporate Governance in Italia: autodisciplina, remunerazioni e comply-or-explain 
(anno 2015), http://www.assonime.it/AssonimeWeb2\, 58, in 2015, listed companies with at least one minority 
director were 90, including three companies, adopting the two-tier system. The total number (90) is slightly down 
from the previous year, 2014, when they were 93, and also from the previous 2013, when the number was 97 , 
depending on the corresponding reduction of the number of listed issuers. As a whole, minority directors in 2015 
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transnational category, consolidated in different jurisdictions, including the Italian 
one.46 In the two jurisdictions under scrutiny, the UK and Italy, the source of this 
category (the independent directors) is different: in Italy, it is partly legislative and 
partly soft law whilst in the UK, it is exclusively soft law. The way independent 
directors are shaped are briefly described in this section, without any pretence of 
completeness of analysis, and exclusively for purposes of better addressing the main 
research question: if and how the Italian minority director is a legal concept that can 
be adapted in other jurisdictions, particularly the British one, and more importantly in 
a prospective supranational layer, the EU one.   
First and foremost, in both countries the independent director is, ontologically, a 
subcategory of the non-executive director47. The latter one, in Italy, is a director whom, 
without management powers, is expected to ‘bring their specific expertise to Board 
discussions and contribute to the adoption of fully informed decisions …’.48 In Britain, 
in a similar but not totally identical way, the non-executive director is the member of 
the BoD in charge of constructively challenging and helping develop proposals on 
strategy.49 As a corollary of this, the non-executive director should scrutinise ‘the 
performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the 
reporting of performance.50  
As far as the executive director is concerned, the British ‘Code’ does not get into an 
explanation of the role, given the absence of a proper definition of this category. 
Indeed, it is hinted at the fact that every company ‘should be headed by an effective 
board which is collectively responsible for the long-term success of the company’51. 
Accordingly, one can assume by exclusion and in a way that is not totally obvious that, 
                                                          
were 172, although the number varies significantly depending on the company size (2.3 directors in FTSE Mib, 
1.9 in the Mid cap and 1.3 among Small cap) and the sector (2.6 in banks). The differences are even more obvious 
in supervisory boards: eg banks holding the ‘two-tier’ system of governance have on average six minority directors, 
equal to 30% of the total of the supervisory board. In 2014, among the 170 minority directors surveyed by 
Assonime, 159 (representing 94% of the total) have been classified as ‘non-executive’; 11, in seven companies (9, 
albeit in five companies in the previous year, 2013) have been qualified as executive. Three of them have performed 
the role of Chairman, one of vice-chairman, four of CEO, the last three were executives without managerial powers.  
46 Remarkably, neither the Italian civil code nor the Italian Code of Conduct for listed companies give minority 
directors any roles within board committees. According to Assonime survey as referred to above, among the 93 
companies fitted with minority directors, 90 (ie 93% of the total) have set up the committee for controls and risks, 
and 87 (90% of the total) the compensation committee. Among those companies with minority directors, 56% 
placed at least one minority director on at least one of the committees. The presence of at least one director of 
minority in JRC is more frequent in larger companies (70% in FTSE Mib, it was the 58% in 2013) and less common 
(45%) in the financial sector. Among the companies with minority directors which set up CR, 50% placed at least 
one of them on the committee. The inclusion of at least one of the minority in the CR is more frequent in major 
companies (65% in FTSE Mib). 
47  See P de Gioia-Carabellese, Non-executive Directors and Auditors in the context of the UK Corporate 
Governance: two (or too many) “Characters” still in the Search of an Author? [2011] European Business Law 
Review 759-789. 
48 Art. 2 of the Italian Code of Corporate Governance. 
49 Section A (Leadership), A 4 (Non-Executive Directors), Main Principle, of the UK Corporate Governance Code, 
September 2014. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Section A (Leadership), A1 (Non-Executive Directors) of the UK Corporate Governance Code, Sep 2014. 
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by setting aside the directors (non-executive directors) who are not given any 
management role,52 the executive directors are those in charge of management powers.  
With regards to the independent directors, the two countries may have more 
similarities in the way this category is defined. They are basically directors who, albeit 
voted by the majority, do not have professional links or other conflicts of interest with 
the majority, although it is the same majority that have appointed them. Nevertheless, 
the British Code somehow clarifies, albeit indirectly, the minimum number of 
independent directors. Except for smaller companies, 53  at least half the board, 
excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the 
board to be independent.54 A smaller company should have at least two independent 
non-executive directors. Furthermore, it is stipulated that the board should appoint 
‘one of the independent non-executive directors to be the senior independent 
director …’ 55 , which ultimately means, tautologically at least one ‘independent 
director’ shall be appointed, as one independent director must be, explicitly, the 
‘senior independent director’. Furthermore, for non-small listed companies, half the 
board should be made up of directors who are at the same time non-executive and 
independent.          
Conversely, according to the Codice di Autodisciplina (the Italian Corporate 
Governance Code),56 the piece of soft law57 that, in Italy, sets forth some guidelines 
in the way the ‘issuer’ is governed and organised,58 the BoD of a company shall be 
made up of both executive and non-executive directors. 59  Unlike the British 
counterpart, it is recommended that an adequate number of the non-executive directors 
will be independent too. More specifically, according to article 3 of the Italian 
Corporate Governance Code:     
‘An adequate number of non-executive directors shall be independent, in the 
sense that they do not maintain, directly or indirectly or on behalf of third parties, 
nor have recently maintained any business relationships with the issuer or 
persons linked to the issuer, of such a significance as to influence their 
autonomous judgement.’  
                                                          
52 According to the same Corporate Governance Code (A.4: Non-Executive Directors, Supporting Principle), the 
non-executive directors ‘should scrutinise the performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives 
and monitor the reporting of performance.’  
53 A smaller company is defined ‘one that is below the FTSE 350 throughout the year immediately prior to the 
reporting year’ (Section B.1.2., footnote 6, of the UK Corporate Governance Code). 
54 Section B.1.2 (Composition of the Board) of the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
55 Section A (Leadership), A 4 (Non-Executive Directors), Code Provisions, A.4.1. 
56  Comitato per la Corporate Governance, Codice di Autodisciplina (July 2015) 
<http://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsaitaliana/regolamenti/corporategovernance/codice2015.pdf> accessed 13 
October 2015. 
57 It will be mentioned later that in Italy the Corporate Governance Code is becoming more a kind of delegated 
legislation. 
58 As already clarified above, this Code is now expressly recalled by the legislation, particularly by article 147 -
ter(4) of the TUF. 
59 A recent analysis in English concerned with independent directors can be read in D Siclari (ed), Italian Banking 
and Financial Law (Palgrave MacMillan, London 2016). 
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The adjective ‘adequate’ is not associated with a number, which means that in Italy 
there is more flexibility in the number of independent directors to appoint.  
Nevertheless, in both jurisdictions the independent directors represent de facto a 
collegiate micro-body within the Board of Directors, ergo no fewer than two 
independent directors which shall be necessarily non–executive directors,60 whereas 
the opposite shall not be necessarily true as a non-executive director can be also non-
independent.61 
Finally, and interestingly, although in Britain no minority director is codified, either 
at legislative level or within the soft law, nevertheless independent directors are 
required to carry out a specific activity that may be vaguely reminiscent of that of the 
minority directors in Italy. Particularly, the senior independent director should be 
available to shareholders ‘if they have concerns contact through the normal channels 
of chairman, chief executive or other executive directors has failed to resolve or for 
which such contact is inappropriate.’62 Nevertheless, it is our understanding that, upon 
closer scrutiny, this function bestowed by the British Code upon independent directors, 
does not equate the independent director to the minority director, as they are 
fundamentally two different categories with two different tasks63. 
 
7.  The Underpinning Philosophy of Minority Directors in the Italian 
Experience 
To be a minority director does not necessarily imply a special impartiality, other than 
that it must be possessed by each director called to contribute to pursue the interest of 
the company.64 It is well known that, within the system of the corporate governance, 
the impartiality of the directors has been associated for a long time with the adjective 
‘independent’. In a nutshell, this would be a director still appointed by the majority 
                                                          
60 The Italian Code of Corporate Governance demands that an ‘appropriate’ number of independent directors is 
appointed. Companies listed in the FTSE Mib are recommended to have a Board of Directors formed by at least 
one third of independent directors. At the end of 2014, 33 companies in the FTSE Mib38 (representing 94% of the 
total) had a Board of Directors, or a Supervisory Board, in line with this recommendation. The Code also 
recommends that the number of independent is, in any case, not less than two. At the end of 2014, 209 companies 
(92% of the total) were already in line with this recommendation. 
61 The lack of a normative category, at least in analysing Britain and Italy, of an executive director who is also 
‘independent’ is probably a flaw existing in both soft law and in the same literature.   
62 Section A (Leadership), A 4 (Non-executive Directors), Code Provisions, A.4.1. 
63 In any case, the minority director will not likely become an executive director, although Italian experience 
evidences a few cases of executive minority directors (see above, note no. 41). Nonetheless, since the minority 
director does not generally perform executive functions, he may be considered, albeit only de facto, as a member 
of the internal control system. This control on the activities carried out by those directors who have been appointed 
by the majority shall be more effective as it is performed by someone chosen by stakeholders (the minority) who 
are likely to be affected by the activity subject to control.  
64 This argument has been highlighted by those (S MICOSSI, ‘Il Punto sugli Amministratori Indipendenti’, Annual 
Meeting Nedcommunity, Milan, 21st April 2011, 8 
<http://www.assonime.it/AssonimeWeb2/servletAllegati?numero=3508> accessed 1st March 2016) who maintain 
that, as a default rule, minority directors should really be independent from the controlling shareholders, although 
nothing prevents the minority directors from engaging in opportunistic behaviour for personal purposes. According 
to this school of thought (ibid), this risk is more severe whenever the investment requested for the presentation of 
the list is modest.  
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shareholders, however not having any ties and/or connections with the majority 
appointing the board.65  
The requirement of independence of directors, for so many years the flagship of the 
stock markets, has been given a serious blow during the financial crises of 2008/2009. 
Although corporations listed in capital markets, including banks, were ‘full to the brim’ 
with independent directors in strict compliance with the relevant national code of 
corporate governance, these companies turned out to be affected by huge losses as a 
result of poor management. The presence of several independent directors in the board 
of listed companies should have, theoretically, preserved the collegiality of the 
decision process; in reality, as testified by the minutes of the boards, independent 
directors were merely figureheads incapable of liaising with the ‘proper’ directors and 
challenging their decisions.66 
Also in the jurisdiction where the minority of directors have been a notion of the 
corporate system for a while, the ratio essendi of this legal concept is not totally 
accepted by scholars. Although there is a general understanding that minority directors 
represent a feature that may eventually improve the way listed corporations are 
managed,67 a certain degree of scepticism still persists regarding the same ontological 
feasibility of this concept.68  
From other quarters, emphasis is placed on the fact that the mechanism of the separate 
lists may lend itself for circumventions,69 despite the fact that the minority directors 
                                                          
65  According to scholars (P Loose, M Griffiths and D Impey, The Company Director. Powers, Duties and 
Liabilities (Jordans, Bristol 2011), independent non-executive directors ‘should bring a completely independent 
view to the deliberations of the board.’  
66  See P de Gioia-Carabellese, ‘Corporate Governance of British Banks and Duties of Directors: Practical 
Implications of the Royal Bank of Scotland’s Demise’ (2014)3 Law and Economics Yearly Review 134-156. 
67 See, among others, F Denozza, ‘L’“Amministratore di Minoranza” e i suoi Critici’ [2005] Giurisprudenza 
Commerciale 1; GF Campobasso, ‘Voto di Lista e Patti Parasociali nelle Società Quotate’ [2003] Banca, Borsa e 
Titoli di Credito (I) 128; F Carbonetti, ‘Amministratori e Sindaci di Minoranza e “Rapporti di Collegamento”’ 
[2007] Società 1186-1190. 
68 F Bonelli, ‘Ecco Perché’ non può Funzionare l’Amministratore di Minoranza’ Milano Finanza, 13 April 20 05, 
13. With even more criticism, see M Cera, ‘Il Buon Governo delle Banche tra Autonomia Privata e Vigilanze 
Pubbliche’ [2015] Rivista delle Società 947. In this respect it is contended that the minority director may be linked 
to either competing companies or investors interested in short-term strategies. The two objections are very different 
from each other and, upon better scrutiny, they may not completely confute the theory, which this papers attempts 
to demonstrate; that a representative of minorities in the board is more an opportunity than a threat. It is worth 
recalling that the minority director may influence the company’s decision-making process only if his or her 
viewpoints and his or her opinions are perceived by the other members of the board as provided in the interests of 
the company. Needless to say, if the minority director used his say in the board for unnecessary or, even, harmful 
purposes, the reasonable consequence will be the marginalization. In this regard, see F Denozza, 
‘L’Amministratore di Minoranza’ [2005] Giurisprudenza Commerciale 767. A further sceptical view is maintained 
by those who argue that the presence of a minority director in the board might result in a fragmentation of the 
‘corporate interest’. See P Montalenti, Amministrazione, Controllo, Minoranze nella Legge sul Risparmio [2006] 
Rivista delle Società 990.; G Strampelli, Sistemi di Controllo e Indipendenza nelle Società per Azioni (Milan 2013) 
102. This opinion is challenged by other legal scholars (M Ventoruzzo, ‘La Composizione del Consiglio di 
Amministrazione delle Società Quotate dopo il D.Lgs. n. 303 del 2006: Prime Osservazioni’ [2007] Rivista delle 
Societa 210) who conversely claim that the minority director does not act as a fiduciary of the shareholders who 
have appointed him. Contra: G Strampelli, Sistemi di Controllo e Indipendenza nelle Società per Azioni (Egea, 
Milan 2013) 102. 
69 G Guizzi, ‘Il Voto di Lista per la Nomina degli Amministratori di Minoranza nelle Società Quotate: Spunti per 
una Riflessione’ [2007] Corriere Giuridico 301-304, particularly 302.  
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may be conducive in sorting out some inefficiencies – minorities not having a proper 
say - and imbalances currently existing in the listed companies.70  
The real conundrum that may somehow question the way the minority director works 
in the Board of Directors of companies is the role as insider he or she is going to play. 
This may eventually favour the interests of a specific minority rather than the general 
minority71. However, also from this perspective, it can be counterclaimed that this 
director, albeit appointed by a minority, is subject - and would be subject, if introduced 
in other jurisdictions - to the same duties of the other directors. Among these duties, 
the most remarkable one is the one that, albeit codified with different formulas in 
different jurisdictions, can be synthesised as the duty to promote the success of the 
company.72 Further, in using the same reasoning, it can be argued that the majority 
directors can encounter the same problem as similarly, these are appointed by the 
majority and their interests could be in contrast with the general one of the company. 
Again, these issues are usually addressed because a demarcation line is usually drawn 
between shareholders – either majority or minority – appointing the directors and 
directors themselves. The directors, either majority or minority, represent an 
autonomous genus, subject to an autonomous regime, including their responsibilities. 
This prevents them from being identified and mingled with those - either majority or 
minority - who appointed them. Finally, more recent evidence suggests that minority 
directors have been so far a quite positive experiment of the Italian corporate 
governance regime.73       
According to the same line of reasoning, some legal scholars74 have argued that 
minority directors can better operate in larger companies, where institutional investors 
are in a position to indicate and appoint experienced competent people. On the 
contrary, in smaller companies minority directors may end up holding individual 
interests. This assertion - not empirically demonstrated - links the success of 
independent directors, including minority directors, to the dimensions of the company 
and, consequently, also to the amount of the provided directors’ compensation. 
 
8. The cumulative voting right: an American counterpart? 
It is well known that in the US there is a possible counterpart of the minority director 
and this is the cumulative voting right. However, the latter does not necessarily have 
the same normative strength. Upon closer consideration, both ‘cumulative voting right’ 
and ‘voting list’ can be considered as an expression of the ‘corporate control theory’. 
                                                          
70 Ibid 201. 
71 From a different point of view, the success of the figure could be compromised by a passive attitude of the 
minority director towards the majority directors. The latter ones will eventually ‘catch’ the former. Nonetheless, 
should this occur, it is unlikely that in the future the minority director would have a seat. Ultimately, this would be 
the most persuasive disincentive against this kind of conduct.  
72 D French, S Mayson & C Ryan, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law (32th edn Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2015) 486-496. 
73 G Vega, ‘Intervento del Presidente della CONSOB’ (2015) Italy Corporate Governance Conference, Milan, 4th  
December 2015. 
74 S MICOSSI, Il Punto sugli Amministratori Indipendenti, Annual Meeting Nedcommunity, Milan, 21st April 
2011, 8 <http://www.assonime.it/AssonimeWeb2/servletAllegati?numero=3508> accessed 1st March 2016. 
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This construct, put forward for the first time in the US around the 1940s, maintains 
that the minority has the right to be represented in the board of directors.75 It is worth 
recalling that the ‘corporate control theory’ was born and developed in response to 
financial scandals. 76  Cumulative voting rights first emerged in the Illinois 
Constitution, art. XI, §. 3. The tenor of the relevant provision is worthy of recollection: 
‘The General Assembly shall provide, that in all elections for directors or 
managers of incorporated companies, every stockholder shall have the right to 
vote, in person or by proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned by him, 
for as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected, or 
combined to said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the number 
of directors multiplied by the number of shares of stock shall equal, or to 
distribute them on the same principle among as many candidates as he shall 
think fit; and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any other 
manner’.  
This model soon became successful in other US States, although not all of them made 
it mandatory. The SEC itself propped up cumulative voting right in the 1930s. Where 
cumulative voting right was made optional, the majority shareholders were able to 
replace the voting system with straight voting by amending the relevant bylaws and 
Courts stated the validity of those amendments.77 In other cases, the system was made 
ineffective by the removal of minority-elected directors without cause.78  
From the 1950s until today the interest towards this voting model is greatly diminished. 
According to some scholars,79 this shift is due to the opposition of the incumbent 
managers in public companies, fearful that the lowering of the voting threshold to get 
a seat on the board of directors makes it easier, in insurgent shareholders, to launch a 
proxy fight. In 1980, the cumulative voting right was mandatory in 19 states, whereas 
now it is six, including California. 
A similar result can be achieved via a legislative route and through a different device: 
‘cumulative or proportional voting rights, which allow relatively large blocks of 
minority shares to elect one or more directors, depending on the number of seats on 
the board.’80 It is reminded that cumulative voting right is the default rule in Japan, 
whereas it is merely permissible in France, the U.K. and the U.S.81 
 
                                                          
75  See The University of Chicago Law School. Comments, ‘Cumulative Voting: Removal, Reduction and 
Classification of Corporate Boards’ (1955)22 University of Chicago Law Review 751-759; LR Mills, ‘The 
Mathematics of Cumulative Voting’ [1968] Duke Law Journal 28-43. 
76 CM William, Cumulative Voting for Directors (Bailey & Swinfen 1951) 20-22. 
77 See for instance Maddock v Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Atl. 255 (Ch. 1929). 
78 See HE Bowes and LA De Bow, Cumulative Voting at Elections of Directors of Corporations (1037)21 
Minnesota Law Review 366-67. 
79 J N Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting (1994)94 Columbia Law 
Review 124-145. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid 91. 
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9. The Possible ‘Legal Transplant’ 
In light of the Italian legislative scenario described above under Section 5 and taking 
into account the consideration contained in the preceding Section 8, it is possible to 
put forward some observations of a comparative law nature. 
First, the minority director, as the administrator who is de facto appointed as a result 
of a list of minority shareholders, can be an effective legal device aimed at improving 
the corporate governance of listed companies. Its possible categorisation in Britain, a 
country where this category does not exist, would entail a rewording of the rules 
governing the shareholders’ meeting as well as a re-assessment of the way entities are 
governed.82  
Second, as mentioned under Section 3 above, the British legislation is not particularly 
interested in the way directors are appointed, a fortiori it is possible to affirm that a 
vote according to lists of candidates, as required in Italian listed companies, would not 
be inconsistent with the corporate rules existing in Britain. Prospectively, once the 
vote according to lists of candidates was regarded mandatory in British listed 
companies, then the only legal provision to be engineered would be, within the CA 
2006, the requirement that the articles of association of listed companies are amended 
so that minority shareholders shall be allowed to appoint a member of the BoD, 
according to competing lists of candidates. In other words, such a provision would not 
drive a coach and horses through the laissez-faire principles adopted by the CA 2006. 
Nor would it destabilise the corporate governance of British companies; it would 
apply to listed companies, rather than the variety of non-listed companies.83       
Furthermore, as things are, the transplant of the minority directors into UK law would 
be an opportunity, rather than a mere legal elaboration. In the current British system 
of corporate governance, as highlighted in the literature,84 the conduct of the directors 
is barely scrutinised, despite the assurances of both the codes and reports.  
Additionally, as demonstrated in this research paper, through an analysis of both a 
doctrinal and comparative nature, the current British rules of soft law and those 
existing in the Italian counterpart show discrepancies in the way independent directors 
and non-executive directors are weighed within the BoD of listed companies, with the 
British entities probably giving more room to this category than the Italian counterpart. 
Beyond these differences, admittedly the same concept of the independent director, 
currently ‘pegged’ and ‘shackled’ on the category of the non-executive, has never 
                                                          
82 For a practical analysis of the debate on the corporate governance in Britain, see V Jones and C Pierce, Corporate 
Governance in the United Kingdom (Global Governance Services Ltd , Orpington 2013).  
83 If transplanted to the UK, it is worth noting that s 160 of the CA 2006 prohibits block voting for a slate of 2 or 
more directors of public companies in one resolution. Nevertheless, this specific legal provision would not prevent 
the implementation. 
84 A Keay, Directors Duties (2nd edn Jordan Publishing, Bristol 2014) passim. 
As far as the US is concerned, this lack of accountability has been highlighted for a while too. See M Ventoruzzo, 
‘Empowering Shareholders in Directors’ Elections: a Revolution in the Making’ March 2010 – Law Working 
Paper no 147/2010 European Corporate Governance Institute 1-39 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228223354_Empowering_Shareholders_in_Directors%27_Elections_
A_Revolution_in_the_Making> accessed 1 October 2015. 
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proved to be particularly effective in the last two decades and would certainly require 
more attention among scholars. 
Moreover, the minority director in the British system would not be inconsistent with 
the non-executive directors and the independent directors. It would be a further genus, 
or a sub-genus of the former, rather than the latter. Its insertions would be a useful 
opportunity to better clarify some current obscurities surrounding the definition of 
non-executive directors and independent directors, in the UK Code.85 Ultimately, to 
put it in the words of the prevailing view, independent directors will continue being 
the ‘principal trusteeship strategy […] for protecting the interests of disaggregated 
shareholders – as well as minority shareholders and non-shareholder corporate 
constituencies’.86   
From a more practical perspective, an opportune question is whether the insertion into 
Britain of this concept may spark off any rejection.87 More generally, the question is 
whether a certain power conferred on a minority may increase the level of litigation 
and, therefore, the same effectiveness of the decision making process of the 
corporation. In this respect, the answer seems to be negative. More specifically, some 
tentative answers could be the following ones.  
(a) The minority shareholder, actually the main minority shareholder to be more 
precise, would be given a real opportunity to understand the way the company is 
managed. This point involves, fundamentally, the way information flows from the top 
management to the board of directors.  
(b) The directors would be under a more challenging scrutiny. The ‘absolute tyranny’ 
of the majority shareholder, which currently characterises the British system of listed 
companies,88 might become an ‘enlightened management’.  
(c) The litigation originating from the decisions of the BoD, which is nowadays 
potentially copious, would turn out to be seemingly decreased. Particularly, derivative 
proceedings which currently are potentially in the hands of the minority shareholder, 
would be de facto prevented, or reduced, as the representative of that minority 
shareholder was already involved in that resolution and could have taken part in it.  
                                                          
85 See above Section 3. 
86 L Enriques, H Hansman and R Fraakman, The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional 
Approach (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) 64. 
87 Legal transplants are far from being unproblematic. For the necessary caveats relating to these processes and 
the literature sprouted around it, see Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2014) 191-221.   
88 Doctrinally, in the past this ‘directors’ dictatorship’ has already been highlighted in the literature, albeit as 
regards Italian companies. See M Ventoruzzo, ‘Empowering Shareholders in Directors’ Elections: a Revolution in 
the Making’ (2010) European Corporate Governance Institute. Law Working Paper no 147/2010 (March 2010) 38 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228223354_Empowering_Shareholders_in_Directors%27_Elections_
A_Revolution_in_the_Making> accessed 1 October 2015.  
In Britain, scholars (see A Keay, Board Accountability in Corporate Governance (Routledge, London 2015) point 
out the issue of the accountability of the BoD and the way it is assessed as regards fairness, transparency, 
practicality, effectiveness and efficiency. See also K Keasey, H Short & M Wright, ‘The Development of Corporate 
Governance Codes in the UK’ in K Keasey, S Thompson & M Wright (eds), Corporate Governance: 
Accountability, Enterprise and International Comparisons (John Wiley and Sons, West Sussex 2005) 21-44. 
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(d) The minority directors, in listed companies, would be, in contrast to independent 
directors, appointed by the minority, who are charge of epitomising the public role as 
‘public gatekeepers for the regulator’. In this respect, the authoritative view advocated 
by scholars89 that independent directors should turn into public gatekeepers is further 
elaborated and made more radical in this paper. Because independent directors are 
appointed by the majority shareholder, its possible role of reporting to public 
authorities seems to be less credible. Thus a system where independent directors 
continue playing their - unfortunately - blurred role of moral suasion of the 
management body may persist, with all its historical deficiencies. Conversely, the 
minority directors, a legislative body not created by the soft law, will be empowered 
to challenge in exceptional circumstances the possible abuse of power perpetrated by 
the BoD. 
Needless to say, if this was the additional task given to the minority shareholders, a 
further, natural step would be to put in place a reform of the legal framework, where 
specific powers of the minority directors vis-a’-vis the market authority, are moulded 
and shaped.  
(e) The evocative reasoning reverberating from the previous letter (d) may suggest 
that this new category is to be introduced in a prospective European Union framework, 
concerned with quoted companies.90 The ultimate purpose of this would be a more 
persuasive system of corporate governance.  
(f) Ultimately, not only would minority directors express the minority voice, but they 
would also add value to the company as a further step towards ‘board diversity’91. In 
this respect, it is a trite view that board diversity positively impacts on organizational 
                                                          
89 M Gutiérrez and M Sáez, ‘Deconstructing Independent Directors’ (2013)13 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
86-87.  
90 In a more conservative way, the category could be introduced within the EU framework exclusively within the 
legislation addressed to banks and financial institutions. For a general overview of the corporate governance of 
banks, see Iris H-I Chiu (ed), The Law on Corporate Governance in Banks (Edwar Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 
2015).   
91 We are aware that the concept of board diversity is commonly used in a different meaning (see D Carter, BJ 
Simkins, WG Simpson, ‘Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value’ (2003)38 Financial Review  
33-53) to include within the ‘minority category’ women, and ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, the issue of board 
diversity - and, in particular, of gender diversity - is just one of the multifarious viewpoints from which to observe 
and look at what the optimal board composition is. The literature, in fact, has analysed the impact on the company’s 
profitability of either the insider orientation of board members and their close ties with management (PL Cochran, 
RA Wood and TB Jones, ‘The Composition of Boards of Directors and Incidence of Golden Parachutes (1985)28 
Academy of Management Journal 664-671) or occupational characteristics of board members (MN Zald, ‘Urban 
Differentiation, Characteristics of Boards of Directors, and Organization Effectiveness’ (1967)73 American 
Journal of Sociology 261-272), primarily in the ‘environment’ of financial institutions.  
The basic idea inspired by the ‘resource dependence theory’ (see HE Aldrich,  Organizations and Environments 
(Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs NJ 1979); J Pfeffer and GR Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: 
A Resource Dependence Perspective (Harper & Row, New York 1978) is that boards of directors are part of the 
organization and its environment, and that board members bring resources to the organization as a consequence of 
their backgrounds (MN Zald, ‘The Power and Function of Boards of Directors. A Theoretical Synthesis’ (1969)75 
American Journal of Sociology 97-111). In general, with the exception of gender, age and ethnic minorities 
representation, the ‘diversity’ to which is attributed greater value is that concerning people with business 
background and experience, even if it increases the consideration towards people that can bring to the board ‘new 
insights and perspectives’. 
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performance and gives value to the firm92. On the one hand, the right to appoint a 
candidate of the minority in the board of directors would not fetter the majority’s 
ability to make resolutions; on the other hand, the minority voice would allow the 
majority to pre-emptively and even tactically take in to due account the voice of a 
potential, future disapproval. 
In conclusion, it is believed and corroborated in this paper, albeit from a mere legal 
point of view,93 that the presence in the board of a director chosen by the minority 
could positively contribute to the communication and interaction within the board. 
This would ultimately make better, rather than worse, the board’s action and, in 
particular, the analysis of matters submitted to it for its resolutions. This point should 
be particularly strategic for banks, where the variety of voices is particularly needed94, 
and more in general for listed companies. Admittedly, the voting list that allows 
minority shareholders, in Italian listed companies, to elect at least one representative 
is nothing more than an alternative system to ‘cumulative voting right’. Both systems 
share the purpose of ensuring that minority shareholders sit on the board, albeit 
through different routes or legal mechanisms. Both minority directors and cumulative 
voting rights are seemingly disliked by managers in public companies with a dispersed 
ownership structure as well as by majority groups in systems with a concentred 
ownership.95 Nevertheless, the strength of the minority director system currently in 
place in Italy lies on its cogency, as it does not leave room for circumventions nor 
derogations.  
 
10. Conclusion 
Amidst the vast and ever evocative confines of corporate governance, the minority 
director, a classification hitherto encapsulated in very few jurisdictions, may 
constitute a new frontier of contention and a fertile terrain of debate and legislative 
engineering. Although leading academics in the field have not refrained from 
analytically broaching the subject, this paper has sought to build on the latest stances 
of legal scholars and makes an express demand that a more incisive use of this 
category is promoted in a broader legal framework, the European Union one.  
The ultimate purpose of the creation of this new category, exclusively for listed 
companies, would be to better preserve the credibility of the market through a more 
                                                          
92 According to the economic literature there is also empirical evidence of a correlation between minority stake in 
the board of directors, and an improvement in the financial value of the company:  D Carter, BJ Simkins, WG 
Simpson, ‘Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value’ (2003)38 Financial Review’ 33-53. 
93 An empirical analysis focused on the usefulness and benefits of the notion of minority directors as the natural 
companion of this theoretical discussion is desirable. Although there is not a total dearth of a quantitative discourse 
on this point (C Malberti and E Sironi, The Mandatory Representation of Minority Shareholders on the Board of 
Directors of Italian Listed Corporations: an Empirical Analysis’ (2007) Universita’ Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, 
Research Paper No 18, 27 February 2007, 1-39), a possible discussion could be the observation of management 
behaviours in companies with or without minority directors, therefore listed companies existing in a jurisdiction 
like the Italian one, where the notion is mandatory, and those operating in a market where the minority director is 
not required. The observation could relate to specific behaviours and/or conducts ascribable to the board, such as 
dividend pay, top manager pay and more generally pay performance sensitivity. 
94 This is the view maintained by G Ferrarini and P Giudici, ‘La Legge sul Risparmio’ [2006] Rivista delle Società 
586. 
95 This is the case of Italy.  
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incisive protection of the investors. Notwithstanding the genesis of a new ‘organ’ 
within the management body, this paper has succeeded in demonstrating that there 
would not necessarily be an infringement of the golden rule to which the corporate 
governance is informed, ergo the management of the company as the outcome of the 
unitary interests of the majority shareholders. Given the obligations of confidentiality 
to which the minority directors would be bound, the decision-making processes at a 
managerial level would be preserved.   
The beneficial outcome of an examination undertaken in this paper of the Italian 
jurisdiction, where this category is codified, may be twofold: a paradigm establishing 
a positive precedent and the scene of an encouraging test. Likewise, the parameter 
discussed, Britain and its system of corporate governance, with the categories 
‘pencilled’ by the ‘soft law’ rather than rubber stamped by legislation, has been used 
as a hypothetical litmus test. In the latter case (Britain), the category of the minority 
directors would not be inconsistent with the domestic corporate law rules, nor would 
it conflict with the multifarious categories of executive and non-executive directors, 
which prevail in the UK corporate codes. Actually, the minority directors would be 
equipped with the tools to attain, through a catharsis of the UK corporate governance, 
a better efficiency of the management body. There is no doubt that the effectiveness 
of minority directors is higher in economic environments, such as the Italian one, 
where the presence of block holders is more obvious. Nevertheless, this circumstance 
does not rule out that, albeit with the appropriate corrections, the presence of minority 
directors in the board may improve the decision-making process of companies in 
dispersed ownership systems too. This is the case in Italy, so shall it potentially be in 
other jurisdictions. 
 
  
